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Structural Analysis and Dianoematics 
The History (of the History) of Philosophy According to Martial Gueroult 
 
Mogens Lærke (CNRS, IHRIM, ENS de Lyon) 
 
Abstract: This article offers an original reconstruction of Martial Gueroult’s 
philosophical conception of the history of philosophy. Gueroult’s studies of authors 
such as Descartes and Spinoza remain among the most widely used today. His 
monographs on individual philosophers cannot, however, be adequately assessed 
without awareness of the position he occupied within French philosophy. They were 
integral parts of a comprehensive project to understand not only past philosophy, but 
also the philosophical importance of the history of philosophy as a discipline, 
elaborated in his so-called ‘dianoematics.’ This article is a reconstruction of that 
project. First, I discuss how Gueroult was positioned in the intellectual landscape of 
his time, before turning Gueroult’s structural analysis and technology of systems. 
Next, I discuss Gueroult’s Kantian approach to relations between philosophy and the 
history of the history of philosophy. Finally, in conclusion, I point to the contemporary 
relevance of his project. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper offers a critical discussion of Martial Gueroult’s (1891–1976) philosophical 
conception of the history of philosophy as a discipline. Gueroult was among the most 
influential French historians of philosophy of the twentieth century, the author of a long list of 
monographs on a host of modern philosophers. Gueroult’s first book, on Maimon, was 
published in 1929, quickly followed in 1930 by a monograph on Fichte (the latter already 
undertaken while a prisoner of war in Germany during the First World War and completed as 
early as 1922). In the English-speaking world, he is probably best known for his two-volume 
Descartes selon l’ordre des raisons (1953) and the volumes on part I and II of Spinoza’s 
Ethics, published in 1968 and 1974.
1
 He also published works on Leibniz’s dynamics (1934); 
on Malebranche, including a short book from 1937 on his psychology and a more 
comprehensive three-volume study from 1955–59; a specialized study of Descartes’s 
ontological proof (1955); a monograph on Berkeley (1956); and a long list of articles and 
book chapters, going as far back as 1924. His last major published work was an account of the 
                                                 
1
 A third and final volume on parts III–V was planned, but never completed. For a fragment, see Martial 
Gueroult, “Le ‘Spinoza’ de Martial Gueroult.” 285–302. 
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philosophy and history of the history of philosophy, the so-called Dianoématique (from the 
Greek dianoema [‘doctrine’]), an opus magnum he first drafted in the 1930s, but continued to 
work on for more than four decades. It was published posthumously in 1979–88 in an edition 
established by his most dedicated student, Ginette Dreyfus, and completed by Jules Vuillemin 
after the death of Dreyfus in 1985.
2
 It comprises four volumes in two books, the Histoire de 
l’histoire de la philosophie in three volumes, and the Philosophie de l’histoire de la 
philosophie. Gueroult also had a long career of teaching that spanned over the central five 
decades of the century. After obtaining his teaching qualification—the notorious 
agrégation—in 1920, he held various positions in the French provinces until taking over Léon 
Brunschvicg’s chair at the Sorbonne in 1945. In 1951, he succeeded the medieval scholar 
Étienne Gilson at the Collège de France, holding a chair in “The History and Technology of 
Philosophical Systems” until 1962. In the 60s and early 70s, he also lectured at the École 
Normale Supérieure de St. Cloud.
3
 
A substantial literature exists in French—including introductory prefaces to his works, 
individual articles, edited volumes, and monographs—dedicated to Gueroult’s 
historiographical project and to the debates it gave rise to, accumulated over more than half a 
century of commentary and controversy.
4
 Until very recently, however, the English-language 
bibliography on Gueroult was very short, essentially consisting of Roger Ariew’s brief 
introduction to his 1984 translation of Descartes selon l’ordre des raisons, François Dosse’s 
attempt to pin down Gueroult’s relationship to structuralism in his Histoire du structuralisme, 
translated into English in 1997, and some instructive pages on Gueroult’s relation to the 
French historiographical tradition and Alexandre Koyré in Cristina Chimisso’s Writing the 
History of the Mind of 2008.
5
 Over the last few years, however, three articles dedicated to 
Gueroult have appeared in prominent journals. First, in 2011, Knox Peden published an article 
in Modern Intellectual History on the protracted controversy between Gueroult and Ferdinand 
Alquié, analyzing it as an example of a broader opposition between a modern French 
rationalism attached to Spinozism as opposed to a more theologically inclined French 
                                                 
2
 Jean Bernhardt, “La philosophie,” 34–35; Sève, “La Dianoématique,” 137–38. 
3
 Bernhardt, “L’enseignement,” 508–9; Bernhardt, “La philosophie,” 33–34. 
4
 For a few highlights, see AA.VV. 1964; Chaim Perelman, “Le réel commun”; Christophe Gioliti, Histoires; 
Jules Vuillemin, La Philosophie et son histoire; Jacques Brunschwig, “Goldschmidt and Gueroult”; Jacques 
Bouveresse, Qu’est-ce qu’un système philosophique?; Pierre Macherey, Querelles cartésiennes. See also the 
general bibliography below. For a forthcoming set of articles on Gueroult’s monographs, see Pelletier, Lectures 
de Martial Gueroult. 
5
 Roger Ariew, “Introduction,” xiii–xv; François Dosse, History of Structuralism, 78–82; Cristina Chimisso, 
Writing the History, 55–57, 132–37, 172. 
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phenomenology associated with one branch of modern French Descartes scholarship.
6
 An 
expanded version figures as a chapter in his 2014 monograph, Spinoza contra 
Phenomenology.
7
 Second, in 2014, Tad Schmaltz dedicated an article in the Journal of the 
History of Philosophy to Gueroult’s reading of Descartes and its importance for Anglo-
American scholarship, stressing the proximity between Gueroult’s structural analysis and 
standard methods of rational reconstruction among analytically oriented historians of 
philosophy, such as Alan Nelson’s conception of “systematic interpretation.”
8
 Finally, in 
2015, A. D. Smith published a long article in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
attempting to rehabilitate Gueroult’s broadly rejected thesis regarding the first propositions of 
the Ethics, to wit, that Spinoza operates with a provisional conception of substances with only 
one attribute.
9
 
These recent contributions are, as far as I can see, wholly unrelated and take vastly 
different perspectives on Gueroult. The articles by Schmaltz and Smith testify to the fact that 
his studies of Descartes and Spinoza have become passage obligé even among Anglo-
American early modern philosophy students, and Gueroult himself an authority to whom one 
must, at a minimum, pay lip service in appropriate footnotes. At the same time, Chimisso and 
Peden’s generally excellent books—and despite the fact that Gueroult is neither the sole nor 
the principal protagonist of their studies which are both set within broader narratives—
demonstrate that Gueroult’s work has today acquired sufficient distance from the present day 
to become itself a possible object of study. The same can be said about the monograph 
dedicated to Gueroult published in French by Christophe Giolito in 1999. Those two 
approaches to Gueroult’s work can, however, not remain unconnected. His monographs 
cannot be adequately assessed or used without some awareness of the position within 
twentieth-century French philosophy that he occupied. They were integral parts of a 
comprehensive project to understand not only past philosophy, but also the philosophical 
importance of the history of philosophy as a discipline.  
This paper attempts an original reconstruction of that general project. The aim is to 
resituate and anchor Gueroult’s work in the methodological tradition that I think he was most 
deeply attached to, namely, a neo-Kantian one. I thus want to show how his famous 
systematic readings of various canonical figures in the history of philosophy relate to a 
                                                 
6
 Knox Peden, “Descartes, Spinoza,” 361–90. 
7
 Peden, Spinoza contra phenomenology, 65–94. 
8
 Tad Schmaltz, “Panzercartesianer,” 6–7; cf. Alan Nelson, “Philosophical Systems,” 236–57. 
9
 A. D. Smith, “Spinoza, Gueroult, and Substance”; cf. Gueroult, Spinoza I. Dieu, 107–40. 
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general project he worked on for the most his career, but which has been entirely ignored by 
English-language scholars and which today is even rarely discussed among French ones, 
namely the so-called “dianoematics.” In the dianoematics, Gueroult mounted a sophisticated 
defense of the philosophical value, or “worth,” of the history of philosophy, devised on the 
model of a kind of transcendental deduction, namely, an investigation into the conditions of 
possibility of the history of philosophy as a discipline. In situating his work within that 
original neo-Kantian framework, I want to dispel a frequent confusion between the method of 
“structural analysis” conceived by Gueroult as early as the 1920s as a distinct approach to the 
history of philosophy and the “structuralism” promoted by authors such as Louis Althusser 
and Roland Barthes in the 1960s as a general method for the humanities. More importantly, 
however, I want to offer an approach to Gueroult’s work different from the those offered by 
the most recent commentators—Pierre Macherey and Knox Peden, in particular—who have 
focused exclusively on Gueroult’s combative controversies with a contemporary intellectual 
adversary, Ferdinand Alquié. As I see it, their approach come at the (too) steep price of 
ignoring the sole project with which Gueroult was preoccupied throughout his entire career, 
namely the dianoematics. Contrary to this, I want to show how we gain a clearer image of his 
intellectual project, including the dianoematics, by retracing his lineage back to an older 
tradition of French “historian-philosophers” who published their work in the late nineteenth 
century and in the first half of the twentieth century. I will stress in particular a previously 
unexplored, but strong connection to the Spinoza and Kant-scholar Victor Delbos. Within his 
own time, these deeper ties to thinkers of a previous generation gave Gueroult’s philosophical 
concerns a somewhat untimely, even nostalgic, character. Pointing to this nostalgic backdrop 
of his work does, however, not detract from its contemporary philosophical interest but rather 
allows us to better discern in what it consists. In conclusion, I will briefly point to some 
valuable lessons that can be drawn today from Gueroult’s neo-Kantian project, regarding the 
philosophical value of the history of philosophy as a discipline, and the importance of 
undertaking the writing of a history of the history of philosophy.  
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I discuss how Gueroult was positioned 
in the intellectual landscape of his time. In section 3, I turn to Gueroult’s structural analysis 
and technology of systems. In sections 4 to 6, I discuss Gueroult’s dianoematics and approach 
to the philosophy and history of the history of philosophy. Finally, in the conclusion, I offer 
my remarks about the contemporary relevance of Gueroult’s project as I understand it. 
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2. Legacy, Controversies, Heritage 
 
Gueroult did not exactly create a “school” in France.
10
 He did, however, exert substantial 
influence on several generations of scholars and students. An important part of his legacy is 
associated with the four people who contributed to his lengthy collective 1977 obituary in the 
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, namely Ginette Dreyfus, Victor Goldschmidt, Louis 
Guillermit, and Jules Vuillemin.
11
 To these four names, one could add Gilles Gaston-Granger, 
but the roster is somewhat open-ended.
12
 Following this line of reception, Gueroult appears 
first of all as the founding figure in a tradition of systematic philosophy which, today, has 
given rise to a particular brand of analytic philosophy in France, most prominently 
represented by Jacques Bouveresse, a former student of Granger and Vuillemin. In 2007–
2008, Bouveresse dedicated a lecture series at the Collège de France to the question “What is 
a Philosophical System?,” including a long appended reflection on Gueroult’s understanding 
of philosophical systems.
13
  
The frequent assimilation of Gueroult to “structuralism” is not unwarranted but rests 
on constructed affinities rather than avowed ones. Hence, Dosse stresses the generational and 
motivational differences between the structuralists and Gueroult, noting how the latter 
vehemently denied any possible comparison, presenting himself as “a traditional professor, a 
true historian of philosophy.”
14
 Gueroult formulated his “structural analysis” long before the 
heyday of structuralism and, as we shall see below, the Kantian roots of his method were far 
removed from the linguistic underpinnings of structuralism. Moreover, the political 
engagement underpinning the structuralist appropriations of the history of philosophy was 
contrary to his self-understanding as a history of philosophy scholar.
15
 Gueroult was the anti-
thesis of a philosophe militant. He was actively trying to shield the history of philosophy from 
being re-deployed for present-day political or philosophical purposes foreign to their original 
intent. And yet, the methodological proximity of Gueroult’s structural analysis to 
                                                 
10
 Giolito, Histoires, 142–5. 
11
 Brunschwig, “Goldschmidt and Gueroult”; Rosset, “De Martial Gueroult à Jules Vuillemin.” 
12
 For a longer list, see Giolito, Histoires, 143n72. 
13
 Bouveresse, Qu’est-ce qu’un système philosophique? See also AA.VV., L’Histoire de la philosophie; Victor 
Goldschmidt, “Remarques”; Vuillemin, La Philosophie et son histoire; Jean Vidal Rosset, “De Martial Gueroult 
à Jules Vuillemin.” 
14
 Dosse, History of Structuralism, 79–80. 
15
 For recent, and excellent, work on the intellectual engagement of French philosophy in the Twentieth Century, 
see Dosse, La Saga des intellectuels français. 
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structuralism were not lost on students and colleagues, sometimes giving rise to happy 
alliances between these seemingly incompatible intellectual cultures. Alexandre Matheron, for 
example, saw himself as such an “intermediary.”
16
 Gueroult was Matheron’s appointed 
mentor while the latter was a researcher at the CNRS in the 1960s and learned much from his 
methodology which he considered “a truly ideal model.”
17
 At the same time, however, 
Matheron’s enormously influential Individu et communauté chez Spinoza of 1969 arguably 
represents the closest one will get to a strict application of a structuralist method to the history 
of philosophy. As Sylvain Zac put it, Matheron had “done for Spinoza what Lévi-Strauss did 
for kinship systems.”
18
 
Gueroult himself, however, preferred framing his own position in relation to older 
predecessors and peers. In this respect, he belonged to a long line of “historian-philosophers,” 
as Merleau-Ponty called them.
19
 He saw himself as working “under the auspices of 
Renouvier, Boutroux, Delbos, Bergson, Brunschvicg, and Bréhier.”
20
 Gueroult treats the 
historiographies of most of the figures on this list extensively in chapter-length commentaries 
included in HHP III, which is dedicated to modern French historiography. In fact, there is 
only one figure who is conspicuously absent from the portrait gallery of HHP III, namely 
Victor Delbos (1862–1916). And yet, Delbos commands a pervasive presence in Gueroult, as 
a master with whom he never explicitly disagrees. Indeed, whenever Gueroult mentions 
Delbos, it is with evident admiration: “the felicitous formula of Delbos”; “Delbos is not in the 
habit of making mistakes”; “they are all morons, except Delbos and Lewis Robinson”; 
“Delbos is never wrong.”
21
 Moreover, throughout the first chapters of the Philosophie de 
l’histoire de la philosophie, Gueroult constantly refers to Delbos, quoting him extensively, 
sometimes over several pages, weaving Delbos’s methodological arguments seamlessly into 
his own.
22
 
Why did Gueroult grant such exceptional status to Delbos? There are several reasons 
for this, which will be clarified in the following, but the first concerns the status of the history 
of philosophy as a scientific discipline. In a review of Gueroult’s Spinoza I. Dieu, Gilles 
                                                 
16
 Alexandre Matheron and Pierre-François Moreau, “Martial Gueroult et Étienne Gilson,” 2. 
17
 Moreau and Laurent Bove, “A propos de Spinoza,” 171. 
18
 Personal conversation between Zac and Matheron quoted in Moreau and Bove, “A propos de Spinoza,” 180. 
19
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Les philosophies de l’antiquité au XX
e
 siècle, 1362–74; Giolito, “L’école française”; 
Giolito, Histoires, 308–12; Chimisso, Writing the History, 53–57. 
20
 Gueroult, “The History of Philosophy,” 582; cf. Giolito, “Pratique et fondement,” 155–58. 
21
 Gueroult, Philosophie de l’histoire, 242; oral statements quoted in Moreau and Bove, “A propos de Spinoza,” 
170, and in Matheron, “Les deux Spinoza de Victor Delbos,” 311. 
22
 Philosophie de l’histoire, 45–48, 52. For details, see note 85 below. 
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Deleuze concluded by proclaiming that “this book grounds the truly scientific study of 
Spinoza.”
23
 The compliment is ambiguous. Deleuze had followed Gueroult’s lectures 
assiduously in the 1950s and had learned from them.
24
 Nonetheless, coming from a student of 
Alquié, the epithet is not necessarily complimentary: Alquié had chastised Gueroult’s reading 
of Descartes for being merely “scientific” and therefore “not satisfying”!
25
 More importantly, 
however, Gueroult did not see himself as the initiator of scientific study in the history of 
philosophy. Instead, as Pierre-François Moreau rectifies Deleuze in an interview on French 
Spinozism, “the true founder of the scientific reading of Spinoza is Delbos, and Gueroult 
always acknowledged that.”
26
 The reason is simple. Delbos was a devoted catholic. And yet, 
as Gilson wrote in Le Philosophe et la théologie, “there was nothing in his teaching or in his 
writings that allowed saying [that he was a catholic]. . . . He wanted his teaching to be 
‘neutral’, so to speak.”
27
 This self-conscious effort toward moral and religious neutrality is 
particularly prominent in Le Problème moral dans la philosophie de Spinoza et dans le 
spinozisme (1893), where Delbos strictly separated the question of the historical meaning of 
Spinoza’s philosophy from its moral implications.
28
 Gueroult’s method was motivated by a 
similar concern, making a “return to authenticity.”
29
 In that respect, his book on Descartes et 
l’ordre des raisons does with Descartes’s Meditations what Delbos’s Le Problème moral did 
with Spinoza’s Ethics, namely placing the study of the systems beyond “a kind of preventive 
criticism” imposed upon the texts by “current preoccupations”; in order “to set them beyond 
our prejudices,” not “accommodate the ideas to our desires” and “demand from the different 
doctrines the salutation to problems that they did not pose and that we impose upon them.”
30
 
Gueroult explicitly highlighted this debt to Delbos in his book on Descartes when quoting him 
in the very first paragraph of the introduction: “‘One ought to be wary of those games of 
reflection which, under the pretext of discovering the deep meaning of a philosophy, begin by 
disregarding its precise meaning’; this maxim by Victor Delbos was constantly on my mind 
while writing the present work.”
31
  
                                                 
23
 Gilles Deleuze, “Spinoza,” 437. 
24
 Guiseppe Bianco, Après Bergson, 288–89. 
25
 Peden, Spinoza contra phenomenology, 74. 
26
 Lærke and Moreau, “Interview med Pierre-François Moreau,” 72. 
27
 Étienne Gilson, Le Philosophe et la théologie, 42. 
28
 Victor Delbos, Le Problème moral, i–ii. 
29
 Gueroult, Descartes selon l’ordre des raisons, I, 10. 
30
 Delbos, Le Problème moral, ii. 
31
 Gueroult, Descartes selon l’ordre des raisons, I, 9; cf. Delbos, La Philosophie pratique de Kant, I; also quoted 
in Philosophie de l’histoire, 242. 
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At the same time, however, Gueroult had to carve out a methodological space for his 
own brand of systematic historiography, navigating between several competing contemporary 
positions. First of all, he had to fight off what he called ‘historism,’ understood as a method 
where “psychology and sociology have finally replaced the philosophical in order to 
constitute the essential of a history of philosophy which will no longer have anything 
philosophical about it.”
32
 Historism represented a “method of the most radical philosophical 
scepticism,” because it did away with “this intrinsic value which renders [philosophical 
monuments] independent of time.”
33
 In particular, Gueroult had to counter Alexandre Koyré, 
a historian of science and philosophy working at the cross-section between Bachelard-style 
French epistemology and the mentality history of the Annales school.
34
 Koyré was Gueroult’s 
main competition for the chair the latter obtained at the Collège de France in 1951, a selection 
perceived as a win for the most conservative brand of French history of philosophy.
35
 
More importantly, however, there was Ferdinand Alquié, a historian of philosophy 
close to the surrealist movement with whom Gueroult entered a rather acrid polemics about 
the reading of Descartes in the wake of Alquié’s La Découverte métaphysique de l'homme 
chez Descartes (1950). Alquié defended a genetic reading of Descartes drawing on insights 
from phenomenology, searching for the fundamental “gesture” of the philosopher, reading the 
philosophy from the first-person perspective, retracing how the work related the most intimate 
existential experiences beginning, of course, with the ontological experience of the cogito. 
Gueroult, for his part, perceived Alquié’s reading as a “novelistic” re-appropriation of 
Descartes’s philosophy.
36
 Similar disagreement was on display again later between Gueroult’s 
Spinoza I and II (1968, 1974) and Alquié’s Le Rationalisme de Spinoza (1981). 
Most recently, Knox Peden has presented the controversy as one that pits “Descartes 
against Spinoza.”
37
 I find that odd. On the face of it, in the first round, the dispute pits one 
interpretation of Descartes against another; in the second round, it pits one interpretation of 
Spinoza against another. Peden, of course, acknowledges that, but also claims that Gueroult’s 
                                                 
32
 Gueroult, Leçon inaugurale, 16. 
33
 Gueroult, Leçon inaugurale, 16 and 18. 
34
 Chimisso, Writing the History, 123–37. 
35
 Chimisso, Writing the History, 132–37; Peden, Spinoza contra phenomenology, 69. 
36
 The accusation of being ‘novelistic’ appears already in Gueroult’s assessment of Alquié’s work as a member 
of the committee at the latter’s 1950 thesis defense. See the anonymous summary published in the Revue de 
métaphysique et de morale the same year: “M. Gueroult complains that M. Alquié pretends to present the true 
Descartes, whereas in fact he only uses him as a pretext for formulating his own thought. His thesis, which 
‘reads like a novel’ is nothing but a ‘fantasy about Descartes’” (Anon. [Henri Dussort], “Soutenances de 
Thèses,” 435; on the identity of the author, see Brunschwig, “Goldschmidt and Gueroult,” 83–84). 
37
 Peden, Spinoza contra phenomenology, 2014: 65–94. 
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reading of Descartes was already “Spinozised” and part of a “broader return to Spinoza.”
38
 On 
this point, he appears to take his cue from Pierre Macherey, who also suggests, with respect to 
a specific objection that Gueroult made to Alquié regarding the status of extension as a 
substance in Cartesianism, that Gueroult, when criticizing Alquié’s reading of Descartes, 
“consciously or not,” was speaking from a from a Spinozist perspective: “It is, in a way, with 
Spinoza’s eyes that Gueroult reads Descartes.”
39
 Peden’s reading is compelling but begs the 
question. While one can legitimately proclaim Alquié more Cartesian than Spinozist, given 
the general chronology of things, there is not sufficient reason to declare Gueroult more 
Spinozist than Cartesian, except if his work is perceived from the perspective of the same 
Spinozist-rationalist tradition the existence of which Peden attempts to demonstrate. 
This said, Peden is perfectly right that this drawn-out polemics had underpinnings that 
concerned not only the principles of the history of philosophy, but also the dominant 
orientations in French philosophy of the time. Gueroult was clearly caught up in the battles 
between structuralism and phenomenology. It is, however, equally clear that he did not want 
to be. When reading the exchanges with Alquié, like those in 1955 at an infamous ten-day 
conference at Royaumont, one is left not only with the “discomfit” produced by their constant 
talk at cross-purposes memorably described by Goldschmidt as “humiliating for the listener 
who believes in the universality of understanding.”
40
 On the side of Gueroult, one also senses 
the irritated distraction of someone who, against his more natural inclination to converse with 
the philosophers of the past and with the “historian-philosophers” of an earlier generation, 
was constantly provoked to intervene in contemporary polemics, being drawn into the exact 
same kind of philosophical battles on the field of the history of philosophy that he wanted to 
avoid for the sake of “neutrality.” 
The famous dispute with Alquié is, without comparison, the context of Gueroult’s 
work which has received the most attention in the scholarly literature.
41
 Indeed, the dispute 
with Alquié has become legacy-defining, in the sense that Gueroult’s work has been 
understood as structured and largely motivated by this admittedly entertaining philosophical 
brawl. Among English-speaking readers, the recent work of Knox Peden has contributed to 
perpetuate this prevalent image of Gueroult beyond the French borders. That focus does, 
                                                 
38
 Peden, Spinoza contra phenomenology, 66, 82. 
39
 Macherey, Querelles cartésiennes, 24 (text based on a 2002 seminar). 
40
 Goldschmidt, “A propos de Descartes,” 67; cf. Brunschwig, “Goldschmidt and Gueroult,” 88–89; Macherey, 
Querelles cartésiennes, 13–32. 
41
 See, e.g. Giolito, Histoires, 114–26; Brunschwig, “Goldschmidt and Gueroult”; Schmaltz, 
“Panzercartesianer,” 4–6; Macherey, Querelles cartésiennes, 13–32; Bianco, Après Bergson, 287–88. 
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however, come at a steep price. As a result of it, the deeper lineages tying his project back to 
the earlier “historian-philosophers” and figures like Delbos have received considerable less 
attention. By the same token, commentators have tended to lose sight of the broader neo-
Kantian framework within which Gueroult’s work on past philosophers was set. In the 
following sections, I shall attempt to restore Gueroult’s monographic work to this original 
philosophical framework.  
 
 
3. Structural Analysis: Vertical History of Philosophy 
 
We can approach Gueroult’s conception of structural analysis somewhat obliquely by briefly 
returning to Deleuze’s 1969 review of Spinoza I. Dieu. As already noted, Deleuze was a 
complicated reader of Gueroult. He was a former student (1944–1948) and research assistant 
of Alquié 1(957–1960). His own book on a Spinoza, published only months after Gueroult’s, 
was originally a secondary thesis written under the supervision of Alquié. Certainly, their 
relationship had been declining since the mid-sixties on account of the younger scholar’s 
increasing infatuation with structuralism and with Gueroult’s teaching.
42
 But Deleuze 
remained on Alquié’s side when it came to the “specificity of philosophy” and did not endorse 
the historiographical “neutrality” promoted by Gueroult.
43
 This may account for the tensions 
in his review of Gueroult’s work on Spinoza which I find less “glowing” and “enthusiastic” 
than do other commentators,
44
 and also very ambiguous in its general characterization of 
Gueroult’s project:  
 
M. Gueroult has renewed the history of philosophy by means of a structural-genetic 
method that he elaborated long before structuralism asserted itself in other domains. 
Within [that method], a structure is defined by an order of reasons, where the reasons 
are the differential elements that generate a corresponding system, true philosophemes 
that only exist in the relations they uphold to each other.
45
 
 
                                                 
42
 Dosse, Deleuze et Guattari, 118–19. 
43
 Deleuze, “La méthode de la dramatisation”; see Bianco, Après Bergson, 289. 
44
 Peden, “Descartes, Spinoza,” 368; Smith, “Spinoza, Gueroult, and Substance,” 656n3. 
45
 Deleuze, “Spinoza,” 426. 
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Despite his affirmations to the contrary, Deleuze is here strikingly unwilling to grant Gueroult 
his own methodological voice. With Émile Bréhier’s distinction between “structure” and 
“genesis” hovering in the immediate background and the dispute with Alquié squarely in the 
foreground,
46
 the characterization of Gueroult’s method as ‘structural-genetic’ comes through 
as almost oxymoronic.
47
 It partly reflects how Deleuze assimilated Gueroult’s method to 
structuralism. Indeed, the expression ‘structural-genetic’ mirrors a claim that Deleuze also 
made—incidentally, while referencing a follower of Gueroult, namely Vuillemin—in his 
contribution on structuralism to François Chatêlet’s history of philosophy, namely that “one 
cannot oppose the genetic to the structural any more than one can oppose time to structure.”
48
 
At the same time, however, Deleuze’s characterization reflects the fact that ‘genetic’ was the 
term that Gueroult himself employed to describe Spinoza’s conception of adequate knowledge 
and of the method to obtain it.
49
 Deleuze implicitly conflates Gueroult’s method with that of 
the philosopher he studied. Similar concerns arise when Deleuze assimilates the ‘order of 
reasons,’ which is the notion employed by Gueroult used to describe Descartes’s method, and 
‘structure,’ which is the general term he used to describe the systematic unity that each 
philosophy qua philosophy aspires to, present already in the subtitle of his 1930 study of 
Fichte on “the evolution and structure of the doctrine of science.” But these different levels 
should not be conflated. Goldschmidt writes in his 1957 review of Descartes selon l’ordre des 
raisons: 
 
one could think that the order of reasons, ‘the order in which M. Gueroult explains 
Descartes’s, was a personal invention of M. Gueroult’s and could be confused with the 
method of structures. It is nothing of the sort. The method of structures, applicable to 
many other philosophers, serves only to reinstate ‘the order of reasons’, from which it 
should be carefully distinguished and which was established by Descartes himself, 
who signaled it as the unique way of properly understanding the Méditations.
50
 
 
                                                 
46
 See, e.g. the following (somewhat disingenuous) remark by Alquié at a conference in Brussels in 1972: “I am 
completely of M. Gueroult’s opinion. The only difference is that, more than he does, I attach importance to a 
genetic perspective on the work” (quoted in Giolito, Histoires, 126n89). 
47
 Émile Bréhier, “Originalité de Lévy-Bruhl”; Bréhier, Transformation de la philosophie française, chap. XI. 
48
 Deleuze, “À quoi reconnaît-on le structuralisme?,” 309 (text written in 1967, first published 1973). 
49
 See, e.g. Gueroult, Spinoza I: Dieu, 13, 27–31. 
50
 Goldschmidt, “A propos de Descartes,” 69. 
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The implication of the distinction—which is exactly the distinction that Deleuze disregards—
is that there are two distinct methodological rules at the base of Gueroult’s systematic 
approach, even when their respective consequences converge. 
The first rule is to search for the systematic and unitary structure elaborated within a 
philosophy, constituting it as a self-sufficient “monument.” Chaïm Perelman cites an 
unpublished text by Gueroult that gives a succinct formulation: 
 
Every philosophy is a world closed upon itself, a confined universe of thought, in 
brief, a system. Indeed, each system presents itself as a demonstration of itself, 
complete in itself within the limits it has outlined for itself a priori, that is to say, 
according to the norm instituted by the original judgment. This self-sufficiency is the 
mark of absoluteness and entails a claim to complete and exclusive validity.
51
 
 
The idea that any philosophy must be understood as a unified system is forcefully present 
from Gueroult’s earliest publications. Indeed, his very first article, a study of Plato’s Laws 
published in the Revue des études grecques in 1924, concludes with the wish, formulated by 
Leibniz in 1715 letter to Nicolas Remond, “that if someone would reduce Plato to a system, 
they would do humankind a great service.”
52
 Incidentally, this particular wish of Gueroult was 
later fulfilled by Goldschmidt in Les Dialogues de Platon. Structure et méthode dialectique of 
1947.
53
 
The approach stands in stark contrast to any kind of deep hermeneutics. Gueroult was 
decidedly uncomfortable with readings straying too far beneath the surface structure of the 
texts and adverse to anything that could be perceived as a reduction of the philosophy to any 
“deeper” level of meaning, be it the psychology of the philosopher or the prevalent mentalities 
in the historical context. This attachment to the letter of the word is another aspect of 
Gueroult’s historiography which was foreshadowed by Delbos, who also argued that, in order 
to avoid saddling past thinkers with motifs foreign to their concerns, one should heed “a 
scrupulous attachment to the systematic form and even to the literal form.”
54
 Appealing to 
unifying principles beneath or beyond the systematic elaboration of a doctrine was no less a 
mystification for Delbos than it was for Gueroult: “I have trouble, understanding . . . those 
                                                 
51
 Gueroult cit. in Perelman, “Le réel commun,” 131. 
52
 Cit. in Gueroult, “Le X
e
 livre des Lois,” 78. 
53
 See Goldschmidt, Les Dialogues. 
54
 Delbos, Le Problème moral, iii. 
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distinctions . . . between the spirit and the letter, the ideas and the system. . . . The necessity of 
signs . . . prevents the philosopher . . . from complacency in confused intuitions, or from 
letting his mind float about in a vague sense of infinity.”
55
 It is not difficult to hear how 
Delbos’s denunciation of “complacency in confused intuitions” resonates with Gueroult’s 
later rejection of Alquié’s reading of the Cartesian “gesture.” 
The second rule is the obligation to “obey a given author’s own instructions” about 
how to read his or her philosophy when engaging with it. Hence, the meaning of a philosophy 
is referred back upon the author as the guarantor of unity, presiding over the interpretation of 
his own work.
56
 The rule is most clearly formulated in the 1962 article entitled “De la 
méthode préscrite par Descartes pour comprendre sa philosophie,” but already governed the 
analyses in the 1953 Descartes selon l’ordre des raisons. As Jacques Brunschwig summarizes 
it, Gueroult’s two-volume monograph is “built entirely, at least on the level of its principles, 
taking methodological declarations by Descartes as the rule for interpreting his doctrine.”
57
 It 
is, incidentally, yet another methodological rule of thumb already formulated by Delbos, 
according to whom “what we search for, to the extent that this is possible, is the doctrine of 
the philosopher as he conceived of it himself.”
58
 
There is some lack of clarity about how, exactly, we should grasp the appeal to the 
name of the author. Later, in a lecture given in 1970 in Ottawa, Gueroult insisted that “the 
method of structures consists less in the exploration of the supposed interiority of the author, 
than in the interiority of his work. For if the author is no longer, the work remains in front of 
us, in books, like a monument.”
59
 The remark regarding the “author” who “is no longer,” 
refers, of course, partly to the simple fact that the discipline is mostly concerned with dead 
philosophers. In 1970, however, Gueroult could hardly ignore the additional resonances of 
such a statement to Roland Barthes’s structuralist principle of autonomous text interpretation 
elaborated in his famous 1968 article “La mort de l’auteur.”
60
 In any case, it is clear that 
Gueroult did not want his rule to be associated with any phenomenological talk of 
                                                 
55
 Delbos, Le Problème moral, v. 
56
 And, said en passant, it is always a ‘his’: to my knowledge, and apart from the occasional mention of 
Elizabeth and the Queen Cristina in the work on Descartes, Gueroult did not write about—or even recognize the 
existence of—any women philosophers, let alone women historians of philosophy. 
57
 Brunschwig, “Goldschmidt and Gueroult,” 100. 
58
 Delbos, “De la méthode,” 373. 
59
 Gueroult, “La méthode,” 12. 
60
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intentionality: the author in question is not beyond or below the work, but in the work.
61
 Fully 
in line with his Delbosian heritage, the principle should be applied entirely on the surface 
level of the text and understood as the obligation to honor, when reading a work, whatever 
principles of philosophical text interpretation are explicitly stated within the work itself. 
Gueroult even affirmed that “every philosophy carries with it, explicitly or implicitly, its own 
discourse of the method, a method which is meticulously adjusted to its specific meaning.”
62
 
The two rules should not be conflated. In the case of Descartes, however, their 
interpretive consequences tend to converge because—at least on Gueroult’s reading—
Descartes’s systematic understanding of philosophy converges with Gueroult’s own. The 
same can be said about Gueroult’s analysis of Spinoza, whom he proclaims an “absolute 
rationalist.”
63
 This explains in some measure why Gueroult applied his method most 
successfully to those two authors. All philosophies are however not equally amenable to the 
approach. Hence, in 1958, while reviewing three-volume study of Malebranche, Jean-Louis 
Bruch thus asked whether Gueroult’s method of structural analysis was “sufficiently flexible 
to be adapted as felicitously and judiciously to the different great philosophies” as it had been 
to Descartes, stressing how “the study of Malebranche exactly puts M. Gueroult’s analytical 
technique to the test.”
64
 Malebranche certainly represented more of a challenge. He only 
managed to hold together the system by acknowledging, as Dreyfus puts it, that “it 
incorporates equivocal concepts and furtive displacements” even though the “concordance 
and harmonies prevail over the discordance and the aporias.”
65
 
And yet, in a sense, it is a mute question whether Gueroult’s method is appropriate for 
all philosophies. For, if the two methodological rules should not be conflated, an indirect 
relation still exists between them. For they are both inseparable from a specific notion of what 
will count as a philosophical text, or what in a text will count as being philosophical, and 
which will exclude a wide range of possible intentions from the legitimate range of 
philosophical intentions. Hence, for Gueroult, philosophy is a conceptual structure, and “the 
discovery of such structures is of paramount importance for the study of any philosophy, for it 
is through these structures that its monument is constituted as a philosophy, in contrast to a 
fable, a poem, spiritual or mystical elevation, a general scientific theory, or metaphysical 
                                                 
61
 Gueroult, Philosophie de l’histoire, 174–78; see also Brunschwig, “Goldschmidt and Gueroult,” 98, declaring 
“the notion of the intention of the author” outright “un-Gueroultian.” 
62
 Gueroult, Leçon inaugurale, 33. 
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opinions.”
66
 Consequently, whatever some philosopher writes that is demonstrably 
unsystematic will eventually be seen as motivated by intentions falling outside the scope of a 
philosophical reconstruction, and considered irrelevant to it. From this, a defining, circular 
relation between structure and intention eventually emerges which serves the purpose of 
excluding a priori any possible notion of non-systematic philosophy. 
When considered from the viewpoint of this “technology of systems,” i.e. from the 
perspective of the structural analysis of doctrines or works, the historiography of philosophy 
“primarily assumes a monographic character, putting the analysis of the constitutive 
techniques at the forefront.”
67
 It corresponds to an ahistorical or “vertical” reconstruction of 
past philosophies: 
 
The doctrines are considered in themselves and for themselves. . . . The historian 
closes himself up in monographs. It is the place of what I would call the vertical 
history of philosophy, a history which is less properly historical . . . , less preoccupied 
with the collective movement of ideas, but philosophical in the sense that it follows 
the deep philosophical signification of the different works taken one by one.
68
 
 
Such vertical reconstruction can, however, only be accomplished by “submitting oneself to 
the immanent laws inherent in the forms within which philosophizing thought encloses itself 
while instituting them.”
69
 Immanence, inherence, enclosure: if the formulation comes through 
as somewhat claustrophobic, it is entirely deliberate. For Gueroult, the autonomy of 
philosophical systems hinges upon the interiority of the conditions of their constitution: 
“[Philosophy] deems itself to be generated by internal reason which justify if as truth, 
escaping the framework of exterior causes”; it “closes up on itself in its autonomy as a world 
that has evaded necessity.”
70
 Or as he puts in Philosophie de l’histoire de la philosophie, 
“Nothing is left on the outside. . . . Every philosophy is an enclosed world, a universe of 
thoughts closed upon itself, in short: a system.”
71
 
The self-sufficiency that Gueroult attributes to philosophical systems has crucial 
consequences for his understanding of philosophical truth, which he sees as something a-
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 Gueroult, Descartes selon l’ordre des raisons, I, 10–11. 
67
 Gueroult, Leçon inaugurale, 30. 
68
 Gueroult, “La méthode,” 10. 
69
 Gueroult, Leçon inaugurale, 23. 
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 Gueroult, Leçon inaugurale, 9. 
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temporal. According to Chimisso, “Gueroult was the inheritor of Gilson’s idea of philosophia 
perennis.”
72
 This is indeed the one respect in which Gueroult did not follow Delbos. For 
Delbos, the force of philosophical systems was predicated on their flexibility in structure, 
assuring continued relevance throughout shifting contexts: “if the internal force of a doctrine 
is measured by the degree of organization it implies, one could also say, conversely, that its 
historical influence is measured by the degree of disorganization it can sustain without 
becoming fundamentally denaturalized.”
73
 Consequently, “what we must aim a rediscovering 
and unearthing is the strong and flexible unity of a philosophy which, without modifying itself 
essentially, has managed to adapt to the most different conditions of existence.”
74
 Contrary to 
this, Gueroult agreed with Gilson that “philosophy appears to itself as eternally valid in itself, 
a-temporally”
75
 and that, consequently, the value of philosophy was predicated upon the 
perennity of its claims. By definition, philosophical truth “is a conception claiming extra-
temporal validity.”
76
 Gueroult did, however, not agree with Gilson about how, exactly, to 
understand this perennial nature of philosophical claims. Gilson, according to Gueroult, 
understood the philosophia perennis in terms of a general structure, as “a logic of abstract 
concepts wherein the individualized structures constituting the systems fade away.”
77
 
Gueroult, for his part, denied that any such general structure could be determined: “There are 
no general structures, but only individualized structures, inseparable from the contents 
attached to them.”
78
 For him, there was not one perennial philosophy of which each past 
philosophy elucidated a part, but only a multitude of philosophies each staking their distinct 
claims to the perennial truth of the whole. For this reason, Knox Peden has depicted 
Gueroult’s project for the history of philosophy as an essentially ahistorical and pluralistic 
one, aiming only at the reconstruction of series of radically distinct systems.
79
 Mitigating this 
pluralism so as to allow for a genuine history of philosophy was, however, exactly the aim of 
the transcendental deduction underlying the “dianoematics,” to which I will now turn. 
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4. Dianoematics 
 
According to Goldschmidt, the “dianoematics represents—ideally—half of M. Gueroult’s 
work, since it constitutes the philosophical theory which underlies and legitimizes the 
historical interpretations.”
80
 The term refers to both a specific work and a life-long project. 
The three volumes of the HHP, published in 1984–1988, comprise a reconstruction of the 
entire history of the history of philosophy in the Western world “from the origins” (in 
Antiquity) to “our days” (which, in the published volumes, meant up to Jaspers in Germany; 
and Gouhier in France.) Gueroult achieved a first primitive version of the HHP in the late 
1930s, but continued to expand and amend the text throughout his entire life.
81
 The second 
book, the Philosophie de l’histoire de la philosophie, was both completed and published 
before the HHP. The manuscript was practically left unaltered after it was written in the 
1930s. For practical editorial reasons, it was also the first volume that was published by 
Dreyfus, in 1979. Nonetheless, and contrary to fact, Gueroult conceived Philosophie de 
l’histoire de la philosophie as methodologically posterior to the HHP, as the (alleged) result 
of “a long investigation regarding the real essence of philosophy the solution of which . . . can 
only be attained at the end and not at the beginning of the research.”
82
 This conceived order of 
the two parts was meant as a direct rebuttal of Hegel, as an attempt “not to postulate in 
advance the prevalence of a philosophical system imposing its formula upon the solution 
searched for.”
83
 I shall return to this point later. 
A simple comparison of the titles of the two parts reveals the basic aim: Gueroult 
wrote a history of the history of philosophy in order to grasp what is philosophical about the 
history of philosophy. Delbos, yet again, hovers in the background of the enterprise. In 1917, 
Delbos published two articles dedicated, respectively, to the “conceptions” and the “methods” 
of the history of philosophy.
84
 Gueroult quotes them extensively in Philosophie de l’histoire 
de la philosophie.
85
 In those articles, Delbos not only defended an idea of systematic 
interpretation akin to Gueroult’s. He also gave a broad vista of how the historiography of 
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philosophy had itself been philosophically informed in the past, arguing, for example, that 
Brucker was guided by his protestant orthodoxy; that Tiedemann was marked by his 
admiration for Leibniz, Wolff, and Locke; that Buhle and Tenneman, in different ways, took 
their cue from Kant etc.
86
 There is no need to linger on the inadequacies of Delbos’s summary 
overview of the history of the history of philosophy. What matters is the striking resemblance 
it has to the basic outline of Gueroult’s dianoematics. Both are motivated by the conviction 
that one cannot separate the history of philosophy from a philosophical investigation into the 
history of itself as a discipline. Just like Delbos’s article, Gueroult’s dianoematics includes 
“not only a history of the history of philosophy, but a history of the philosophical conceptions 
of this history.”
87
 They share the idea that the history of the history of philosophy is eminently 
philosophical or, as Gueroult puts it, that “the critical history of the history of philosophy 
constitutes an indispensable introduction to the transcendental philosophy of the history of 
philosophy.”
88
 The question is then how, exactly, Gueroult establishes this transcendental 
loop between philosophy and the history of its history. Indeed, in a technical sense, this is the 
exact “problem” that the entire dianoematics is concerned with. 
For Gueroult, “there is no philosophy without resolution of problems”; “all the great 
doctrines can be characterized by problems.”
89
 And, according to an unpublished draft quoted 
by Goldschmidt, he considered the Philosophie de l’histoire to be, exactly, a “philosophy of 
the problem.”
90
 Hence, the dianoematics is an avatar of what Leo Catana, in recent work, has 
characterized as “problem history of philosophy,” a tradition that can be traced as far back as 
to Georg Gustav Fülleborn and was prominent in neo-Kantian historiography.
91
 One could 
also point to a source closer to home, namely Émile Bréhier who, following Bergson, 
similarly placed the category of the “problem” centrally in his historiography.
92
 Be that as it 
may, common to most problem histories is the idea that the history of philosophy proper plays 
out as different solutions to certain perennial philosophical “problems.” This, however, is not 
how Gueroult goes about it. He gives a reflexive, transcendental turn to the notion. The 
problem of the history of philosophy cannot be summarized by a list of concerns about God, 
man, and the cosmos but is rather related to “The history of philosophy as a philosophical 
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problem,” as Gueroult entitled a contribution to The Monist in 1969. In short, the “problem” 
concerns the discipline’s own truth conditions and legitimacy as a discipline.
93
 
Now, as we have already seen, each philosophy claims philosophical worth for itself 
only by affirming some determinate truth which, as philosophy, transcends history. No 
philosophy qua philosophy claims only historical validity. This places the historian of 
philosophy in a paradoxical situation very different from that of a regular historian: the 
historian of philosophy is supposed to write the history of something which, by its own 
nature, resists its own historicity, or which does not want to have a history: “Philosophy 
repels history.”
94
 And yet, despite this resistance, philosophy cannot “excommunicate” 
history, since “doubtless, every philosophy affirms itself by revolting against tradition; it 
abolishes it in order to install itself.”
95
 In fact, each time, by the very act of positing itself in 
exclusion of other, competing systems, philosophies cannot help recognizing not only the 
factual existence of the latter but also their own historical situation in relation to them. Hence, 
“philosophy’s past presents itself as a succession of doctrines excommunicating each other 
mutually but without being able to triumph in their pretenses to a truth that is a-temporal, 
universally valid and definitively acquired.”
96
 And this, exactly, is the problem that every 
historian of philosophy must face, i.e. “how to reconcile the historicity of philosophy with the 
philosophical truth of all philosophy.”
97
 
 
 
5. Reality, Philosophical and Common 
 
The way Gueroult goes about solving the problem reveals his deep debt to Kant, a 
philosopher about whom he never published a monograph but whose presence is only the 
more pervasive by being diffuse and often implicit.
98
 As Louis Guillermit writes: 
 
If we stick to the appearances of the published texts, it is at first striking to see how, in 
the immense work of M. Gueroult, Kant’s philosophy is, at the same time, 
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omnipresent and approached in an indirect way. . . . The presence and force of the 
Kantian inspiration can be seen at the heart of the philosophical conception which, 
under the name of dianoematics, governs the conception that M. Gueroult proposes of 
the history of philosophy. As soon as one recognizes that all the originality and depth 
of his work essentially resides in a complete submission of the historian’s task to the 
requirements proper to the philosophy it takes for its object, the idea imposes itself 
that the critical essence of the Kantian philosophy assumes the function of a veritable 
paradigm within it.
99
 
 
The Kantian “paradigm” that Guillermit has in mind relates to Gueroult’s understanding of 
the dianoematics as a “critique of historical reason” and as a “transcendental deduction” of the 
conditions under which the history of philosophy is possible as a discipline. Hence, the 
“dianoematics” is the idea of a discipline which is, at the same time, positive and 
transcendental. It is positive, because “it is first of all about trying to account for the given 
facts”; transcendental since it poses the problem of “how the ‘philosophical experience’ is 
possible in history.”
100
 The truth and value of the history of philosophy can only be 
determined relative to such a transcendental deduction of its own conditions of possibility. 
This deduction rests on two basic presuppositions about the worth or value of philosophy and 
about the nature of truth. 
First, the history of philosophy is inseparable from a philosophical interest, which 
alone justifies the effort we put into studying it: “No philosopher would undertake a history of 
philosophy if the philosophical interest which conditions the undertaking of this history is 
absent.”
101
 That is why “the historian of philosophy cannot legitimately be indifferent to 
philosophies or neglect the philosophical significance of their substance, that is, of their 
possible connection to philosophical truth, since it is that interest which establishes these 
philosophies as objects worthy of a history.”
102
 Gueroult is not arguing that the history of 
philosophy as a discipline has value only to the extent that it actually attains such 
philosophical truth.
103
 He simply claims that no one would engage in the writing a history of 
philosophy unless they assume that such philosophical truth is present within it. And the kind 
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of truth claims that philosophy qua philosophy makes, as opposed to psychological or merely 
historical truths, must transcend particular time and place: “The philosophical truth always 
presents itself as enveloping a doctrinal object of a universal and a-temporal character, 
beyond every past and every history.”
104
 It is always a “conception claiming extra-temporal 
validity,” as opposed to history which is “exact, authentic reconstruction of a fact or a series 
of facts in the past.”
105
 Therefore, the philosopher must be “dogmatic” about his own 
discipline: “He must believe in the presence of a certain real substance is each philosophy. It 
is this very substance that grounds is for him as the possible object of a history,” for “it is this 
‘essential’ [thing] which, making the systems objects worthy of a history, sets them outside 
historical time.”
106
 
Second, the historian of philosophy must accept the traditional definition of truth as 
adaequatio rei et intellectus as valid for all philosophical systems, as “the truth that every 
doctrine aspires to at heart.”
107
 Coherentist and pragmatist conceptions of truth are not 
genuine competitors to correspondence theory but reducible to particular conceptions of 
correspondence theory.
108
 Consequently, the truth claims of philosophy are always claims to 
representing something real or essential about the world. In this sense, a philosophy is an 
imago mundi: 
 
Every philosophy is, and must be, an image of an original and derives its truth, that is 
to say, its reality as philosophy, from the authenticity of this image in relation to the 
original. . . . That means that it has no other aim than to reveal, as much as possible, 
the essence of a reality which is offered to it from the outside.
109
 
 
As images of the world, philosophies posit themselves as re-constructions rather than 
just constructions: “Philosophizing thought . . . does not aspire to construct an imaginary 
world, but a real one: that is why it affirms that it reconstructs.”
110
 And yet, each philosophy 
posits within itself only the determined reality which corresponds to it. This projected reality 
which each philosophy gives itself constitutes what Gueroult describes as its “philosophical 
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reality.” It is distinct and separate for each philosophy and determined from within the 
structures that make up the philosophy in question: it is the reality of which it claims to be the 
true image. The philosophical reality is ascertained by a philosophy’s “certain positing of 
itself as the maximal synthesis of all possible determinations,” giving it “self-sufficiency.”
111
 
This projected reality is the object that a system is the image of, or that it reconstructs. 
Now, from the view point of their respective philosophical reality, it makes no sense to 
enquire about the relative truth-value of one doctrine in relation to another, because they do 
not refer to the same reality, or do not have the same objective truth conditions. As already 
noted above, despite adhering to some notion of philosophia perennis, Gueroult is also a 
pluralist about the truth of philosophical systems. Each of them make separate, 
incommensurable, and equally legitimate truth claims about the nature of a reality they posit 
for themselves, and which does not exist prior to them: “The fact that philosophizing thought 
projects out of itself an objective ‘double’ of the world that it constructs, and conceives of 
itself as reproducing that world, does in no way imply that this world exists prior to its 
construction as the model exists prior to its image.”
112
 
And yet, as we have already seen above, the systems are necessarily related. This is 
because, within its own sphere, each philosophy, posits itself as an image of the whole truth: 
“Each philosophy recognizes its own validity in the fact that it brings about an understanding 
of reality, an explanation which is either total or maximal.”
113
 Systems are like monads: they 
each comprise a whole world.
114
 Consequently, two systems, with distinct principles of 
construction, cannot co-exist without their respective aspirations to capturing the whole truth 
entering into conflict and competition with each other: “In order to live, all [doctrines] lay 
claim to [se disputent] the same reality in order to make of it their own [reality], instead of 
each of them confining itself to its own reality.”
115
 Consequently, each philosophy necessarily 
posits itself historically in opposition to other philosophies: “Each philosophy . . . posits itself 
in exclusion of any other.”
116
 This is why every philosophy not only posits, internally, a 
determined philosophical reality for itself. It also, in and by the very act of excluding every 
other philosophy from its horizon, and thus acknowledging a mutual claim to a shared object, 
necessarily also posits a relation to an indeterminate reality external to its own philosophical 
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reality. This exterior “common reality” of philosophy is the common element of truth in 
which all philosophy qua historical is submerged. 
The common reality remains perfectly indeterminate: “The relation to the real is the 
condition of possibility of all philosophy. By this, however, it is by no means determined 
what reality it is about, nor the nature of that reality.”
117
 But it is completely open to any 
systematic determination: “The common reality has been posited as indeterminate and open to 
all the determinations that the different systems manage to attribute to it, each within its 
sphere.”
118
 Hence, even though claims to the whole truth of philosophical systems are posited 
externally in antagonistic terms, and that the philosophical realities they each posit internally 
are incommensurable, this very antagonism and incommensurability also points to a 
“common part by which they are conciliated.”
119
 For if all self-sufficient philosophical 
systems entirely disagree about what is the common reality they all vie for, they also all agree 
that it is, or that it exists: 
 
[All the philosophies] agree to remove all of its determinations and to leave of it only a 
completely undetermined residue = x, similar to that ‘transcendental object’ which, as 
the object in general and conceived while abstracting from every intuition, is 
interchangeable with ‘nothing.’
120
 
 
The common reality is, in short, what each and every philosophy claims to be the truth of, it is 
“the thing to understand.”
121
 It is the “true reality,” “absolute reality,” even the “really real 
reality,”
122
 which, nonetheless, proves decidedly elusive within Gueroult’s scheme, a 
transcendental residue which amounts to “nothing” because, in itself, it is deprived all 
determinations.
123
 And yet all philosophies affirm its existence, and this transcendental 
“residue” or “common part” forms the objective truth condition of the history of philosophy 
as such. For the common reality is the philosophical condition under which the history of 
philosophy can be construed as a whole, as driven historically by a common concern for 
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knowledge of the world, despite the fact that each philosophy posits itself as a self-sufficient 
imago mundi: 
 
The common reality appears as an internal law, purely formal, of philosophizing 
thought; a law that is indeterminate with regard to content; a law that grounds the 
necessity through which the different real syntheses of the interior and the exterior are 
possible for the philosophizing thought, syntheses each of which constitute a system or 
philosophical reality.
124
 
 
The relation between philosophical and common reality is the centerpiece of a “radical 
idealism” the aim of which is to establish “that all the systems have a specific reality and that 
the affirmation of each of them is necessarily enclosed within this reality.”
125
 Radical idealism 
refers to the incommensurability of the philosophical, determinate realities projected by each 
system, as monuments perceiving themselves as a-temporally true images of the whole of 
their determined reality. And yet, at the same time, those systems factually emerge in history 
as competing doctrines, each staking their claim to a wholly indeterminate common reality. It 
is in this sense that “the concept of a completely undetermined common reality remains as the 
condition of possibility of the living philosophical experience in history,” with emphasis on 
history.
126
  
 
 
6. The Fact of Philosophy 
 
It remains now to account for only one last aspect of Gueroult’s treatment of the history of 
philosophy as a “problem.” It relates to the exact role played by the “living philosophical 
experience in history” figuring in the quote with which I finished the previous section. I have 
described Gueroult’s dianoematics in terms of a “transcendental loop” connecting the history 
of philosophy to philosophy itself via the history of the history of philosophy. Now, for 
Gueroult, this loop must eventually be accounted for, not a priori but a posteriori, from the 
experience of past philosophy; it must spring “from the spontaneous reflection on the object 
naturally offered here to the historian, in this case the philosophies, eternal monuments of 
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human thought.”
127
 In short, when reconstructing which relations, exactly, the history of 
philosophy as a discipline has historically entertained with philosophy itself, one must take 
one’s point of departure in the “experience of the fact” of past philosophy.
128
 It is the aspect 
of his method we have already encountered under the label “positivism” above. 
The stress Gueroult puts on the factuality of philosophy’s past betrays a certain 
allegiance to the Rankian notion of history as being concerned with “how things actually 
were.” Gueroult derides Ranke’s formula, “disarming in its useless simplicity” and yet his 
own conception of the history of philosophy is not far removed from “a definition 
corresponding to the one formulated by Ranke,” as “the exposition of doctrines such as their 
authors actually thought them.”
129
 The form under which philosophical doctrines are made 
available to us in such a factual, transparent way is as texts. This is also why Gueroult 
characterizes his method as a “return to the text.”
130
 More concretely, for him, it is a call to a 
work, i.e. a set of texts associated with a name: “The work, for its part, is there in front of us, 
in books, like a monument, an object.”
131
 Hence, as Victor Goldsmith points out, “the 
empirical point of departure, if not of the enquiry then at least for the problem, could even 
justify a reduction of ‘philosophies’ to ‘works.’”
132
 
Now, by reason of this a posteriori starting point in the factual existence of past 
philosophical works, the dianoematics represents an “overturning of Hegelianism,” to the 
extent that it amounts to denying that any a priori philosophy of history governs the relation 
between philosophy and its history.
133
 It is, however, not only Hegelian a priori principles of 
the history of philosophy that Gueroult rejects, but any such principles, be they dialectical, 
logical, phenomenological, or other. In many ways, the three volumes of HHP are just is one 
long effort to hunt down and exterminate a priori principles in previous historiographies, as 
part of a general “critique of historical reason.”
134
 For example, he objects to Gilson’s logical 
conception of philosophia perennis because it reduces the history of philosophy to “an 
abstract history that dissociates the correct from the incorrect a priori.”
135
 Or again, he 
congratulates Renouvier for not “deducing a system of history from an a priori philosophy a 
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system of history, but only fashioning a classification of system,” taking his point of departure 
in the “naked experience” of past philosophy.
136
 At the same time, however, he complains 
about the execution of this project, because Renouvier had finally, and contrary to his own 
initial ambition, given in to the temptation of elaborating a classification based on “a priori 
normative” criteria that only his own system of consciousness could honor.”
137
  
Those are just two examples among many of the way in which Gueroult proceeds in 
HHP. His constant rejection of any a priori principles for the discipline first of all reflects a 
deep sense of responsibility toward past philosophy as a fact not to be tampered with. Hence, 
he writes, “the history of philosophy can be envisaged in two ways: philosophically, as a 
problem; historically, as a fact.” Considered as a problem, as we have seen, “one asks how 
philosophy can be, at the same time, a truth, which is a-temporal by definition, and a 
succession of doctrines following each other in time, being consumed into a fleeting past.” 
However, “next to the history of philosophy as a problem for philosophy, we have the history 
of philosophy as an incontestable fact.”
138
 According to Goldschmidt, “this empirical point of 
departure is of paramount importance: M. Gueroult has frequently insisted upon this point, 
and it is this point of departure which bestows upon the project of dianoematics its true 
originality.”
139
 
Gueroult’s basic claim regarding this “living experience” of philosophy is double. It 
posits, first, as a fact, that philosophy has been as the empirical condition for the history of 
philosophy as a discipline. At the same time, however, as the condition under which the 
relevant facts can be recognized as philosophical, it posits a minimal definition of what 
philosophy has (always) been: it comprises, as we already know, any systematic concern for 
a-temporal truth, or any “philosophizing thought.”
140
 This minimal determination is, however, 
itself drawn from the experience of philosophy’s past existence as “a determination founded 
not on a priori concepts, but on our living experience of it in history.”
141
 The argument is 
transparently circular but not necessarily viciously so: It points to the irreducibility of 
philosophizing thought. Beyond that minimal definition, however, “philosophy itself keeps 
changing its conception of its own essence,”
142
 which is why “the determination of what is 
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philosophy, of its essence, of the kind of truth which is proper to it, is what must conclude the 
investigation, not what must introduce it.”
143
 Certainly, philosophizing thought as such is as 
elusive as the common reality it aims at capturing: We only perceive it in its manifestations, 
namely philosophical systems. Those systems are, however, given as facts, or, as Bernard 
Sève puts it, Gueroult’s “only postulate is to admit the reality of the philosophical monuments 
of tradition.”
144
 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Gueroult’s 1951 inaugural lecture at the Collège de France begins with a “Platonist dream” 
about “almost forgetting the world, and locking oneself up in the divine city of ideas” and a 
description of philosophies as “impalpable et invisible monuments.”
145
 Those words reflect 
the sentiment of a philosopher who did not feel quite at home. Gueroult did engage vigorously 
in contemporary polemics; he was “combative” and “capable of condemning without appeal,” 
as Fernand Brunner puts it.
146
 But he also literally dreamt of escaping from it, taking refuge 
not only in the a-temporality of philosophical systems and in the past experience of their 
history, but also in methodological discussions with respected predecessors like Delbos and 
Gilson. The dianoematics, a project that encompassed Gueroult’s entire career, stands out as a 
monument to this nostalgic dream. In this light, the protracted dispute with Alquié comes 
through as a frustrating distraction more than an intellectually defining controversy, and the 
alleged proximity to structuralism as a faux ami tending to obfuscate his allegiance to 
“neutrality” and resistance to morally, religiously or politically informed appropriations of 
past philosophy. Indeed, one gains a clearer understanding of Gueroult’s general project by 
seeing him as an heir of Delbos than as an adversary of Alquié. And one acquires a more 
focused image of Gueroult’s methodology by situating his historiographical practice as a 
particular form of neo-Kantianism originating in the historiographical discussions of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries than by comparing it to the phenomenological or 
structuralist schools contemporary with his tenure at the Collège de France.  
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Over and above these gains in the historical understanding of Gueroult’s particular 
place in twentieth-century French philosophy, I believe that there are also philosophical 
benefits to envisaging Gueroult’s project within the broader neo-Kantian framework wherein 
it was originally conceived. It brings out a contemporary relevance to his work which 
otherwise risks getting overlooked. Certainly, Gueroult’s well-known philosophical 
monographs are, and will remain, very useful tools for historians of philosophy working on 
Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche, etc., as extremely detailed and systematic interpretations 
with which to compare and confront their own. Moreover, his perennialist outlook on the 
value or “worth” of philosophy should maintain a clear appeal for many analytically minded 
readers of past philosophy. However, when considered within the framework of the 
“transcendental deduction” governing the dianoematics, his general project also offers a 
sophisticated lesson about the epistemological and justificatory underpinnings of current 
methodological discussions among historians of philosophy—a lesson which applies well 
beyond the French context. In the Anglo-American context, over the last decades, 
methodological discussions about the history of philosophy as a discipline have most 
frequently turned on the question of what use the history of philosophy is to philosophy, if 
any.
147
 Within these discussions, focused on what is philosophical about the history of 
philosophy as a discipline, the historical nature of that discipline has been largely overlooked, 
with a few notable exceptions.
148
 The dianoematics is a detailed exploration of that 
disciplinary history. Gueroult, of course, is not the only scholar to have written a 
comprehensive history of the history of philosophy. Comes to mind here in particular 
Giovanni Santinello’s collective work Storia delle storie generali della filosofia published in 
five volumes between 1979 and 2004,
149
 the first three of which have appeared in English 
translation over the last twenty years under the title Models of the History of Philosophy.
150
 
Impressive as they are in both depth and breadth, Santinello’s volumes do, however, not 
provide much in terms of a philosophical framework for the enquiry into the history of the 
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discipline they offer. Gueroult is (putting to one side Delbos’s article from 1917 from which I 
think Gueroult originally took his cue) the one who has most systematically explored the 
philosophical underpinnings of the discipline in both historical and philosophical 
perspective.
151
 By doing this, he has pointed to an important strategy of argumentation which, 
until now, has been left largely unexplored by historians of philosophy attempting to establish 
the philosophical credentials of their work. It is the idea that a genuine understanding of the 
philosophical value of the history of philosophy requires that we gain better knowledge of 
how the discipline itself has been used in the past for philosophical purposes, that is to say, 
that we engage in the writing of a philosophical history of the history of philosophy as a 
discipline. As I see it, this particular challenge forms one of the most important contemporary 
legacies of Gueroult’s neo-Kantian project.
152
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